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Abstract
Cyber attacks have significantly increased over the last few years, where the attackers are highly
skilled, more organized and supported by other powerful actors to devise attacks towards specific
targets. To aid the development of a strategic plan to defend against emerging attacks, we present
a high-level taxonomy along with a cyber defense model to address the interaction and
relationships between taxonomy elements. A cyber-kinetic reference model which is used widely
by U.S Air Force is adopted as a baseline for the model and taxonomy development. Asset,
Cyber Capability, and Preparation Process are the three high-level elements that are presented for
the cyber defense capability model. The Cyber Capability, as the focal point of the study, uses
three classifiers to characterize the strategic cyber defense mechanisms, which are classified by
active, passive and collaborative defense. To achieve a proper cyber defense strategy, the key
actors, assets and associated preparation procedure are identified. Finally, the proposed
taxonomy is extensible so that additional dimensions or classifications can be added to future
needs.

Keywords
Cyber Security, Cyber Defense Model, Taxonomy, Cyber Actor, Cyber Attack, and, Active
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1. Introduction
The expansion of cyberspace usage over the past two decades, resulted in access to the internet
for almost every location on the globe (Choucri et al. 2014). Since 2000, by technological
enhancement in Information Technology (IT) and improvement in internet networks, the overall
number of internet users has been dramatically increased by 673 percentages to 2.8 billion users
(Global Internet Report 2014). Modern societies are highly dependent on IT and notably on the
internet for survival. IT and information systems will facilitate innovation, product and services,
and communication for the modern economies. According to the Global IT Report, The
productivity promised by ICT for some nations is estimated to reach up to 10% of their GDP by
2015 (Klimburg 2012).

Increased reliance on ICT and information systems leads to increase in emerging risks and cyber
attacks. Cyber attacks are now becoming more sophisticated in terms of impact and scale. A
large-scale cyber attack spreads in a matter of seconds, leading to substantial damage to
individuals, corporations, and nation-states. Recently, other cyber actors such as criminals,
hacktivist, whistleblowers, and cyber fighters became more engaged in the events that take place
in cyberspace. However, the key dilemma for the governments and organization s is to recover
from a cyber incident in a timely manner while minimizing the adverse impact. The ultimate goal
for every nation is to safeguard its sovereignty, economy and critical assets against any national
threat(Klimburg 2012).In order to mitigate cyber attacks, nation states need to assess their cyber
capabilities and preparation procedures while identifying the key actors and the critical assets
associated with them. This approach is very similar to McCumber Cube Model, which refers to
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems through technology, human
factors and, policy and procedures (McCumber 2004).
In conjunction with McCumber’s security model, this Study seeks to illustrate a model for cyber
defense capability which can be used to prepare and respond to cyber threats. For this reason, the
main pillars of the current study, cyber defense capability model, are derived from Cyber/Kinetic
inference model, which is demonstrated by U.S Air force during the advanced course in
Engineering Cyber Defense Exercise. The rest of the proposed model is based on previous
studies that are relevant to this setting or covering the defense mechanisms that are already in
place or would be applicable.
Moreover, the proposed model offers a new taxonomy at a strategic level to assist the users to
adopt an appropriate defense strategy during cyber incidents. Although a considerable number of
extant literatures proposed a tactical or operational level taxonomies to classify attacks,
vulnerabilities or intrusions, to our best knowledge, this is the only study that attempts to
elucidate the synergy and interaction between various cyber defense capabilities.
The paper starts by presenting the previous taxonomies on cyber attacks and defense in Section
2.The following section presented the groundwork for the taxonomy by illustrating the cyber
capability reference model. Section 4 discussed the criteria for an acceptable taxonomy, while
the proposed taxonomy and the breakdown of the cyber defense capabilities are discussed in
Section 5. Finally, the conclusion and the future study is presented in Section 6.

2. Review of Previous Taxonomies
Fred Cohen’s (1997) early work has identified 94 different computer attacks and techniques
under a single classification. Although the findings could help security experts to protect
computers and Information Systems (IS), the taxonomy is almost a repository or database for
different kinds of attacks. Lindquist and Johnson (1997) have introduced a new concept which is
called the dimension of classification which is used to classify specimens based on specific
attributes. Therefore, they have suggested that all the computer attacks can be classified into two
dimensions, according either the intrusion technique or intrusion result.
Howard (1998) has presented a process-based taxonomy that classified security incidents
according to a series of computer attacks and events. The proposed taxonomy divided computer

attacks into five series of steps that can be taken by an attacker to compromise networks or
information systems. Although the study offered a practical baseline for cyber attacks, it failed to
provide enough insight towards the motives and objectives of the attacks. Hansman and Hunt
(2004) suggested an overarching taxonomy that classified computer and network attacks into f
attack vector, target, vulnerability and payload. Although the taxonomy can be used widely at an
operational level, blended or mixed attacks such as Advances Persistent Threats (APT) cannot be
categorized properly in taxonomy.
Simmons et al. (2009) suggested a cyber attack taxonomy which called AVOIDIT (Attack
Vector, Operational Impact, Defense, Information Impact and Target). Distinct from the previous
studies, it was able to encompass the blended attacks like Stuxnet. As a tactical taxonomy,
AVOIDIT can be used by the security managers during the security management processes or in
development of information security policies. In spite of the usefulness and insight, the
taxonomy is not comprehensive enough to be used for high-level defense strategies that
safeguard critical infrastructure against cyber threats.
Killouri et al. (2004) declared that the previous studies are mostly attack-centric taxonomies that
widely can be used by the attackers rather than the system defenders. Hence, they offered a
taxonomy that could predict whether an intrusion detection system (IDS) can detect all related
attacks in a particular attack class. The focal point of the study was to signify that the defensecentric taxonomy offers greater benefit and flexibility for IS defenders rather than attack-centric
taxonomies. Kjaerland (2005) has studied the cyber intrusions on commercial and government
sectors. Kjaerland perceived attack and defense-centric taxonomies can be used as
complementary to estimate the severity of attacks or the suitability of the defense controls.
Scott and Angelos (2013) proposed an extensible taxonomy that could classify events and
associated impacts by demonstrating the interaction between actors, vector, and types of attacks.
By using this taxonomy, the end user can cross-tabulate all cyber events that pertain to a
particular actor or all the attacks that are using a similar attack vector. Understanding these
relationships and links can help the end user to develop a cyber strategy program.
In much of the previous literature, security taxonomies were divided into three general
categories: attack, vulnerability, and intrusions. These are subjected to be technical taxonomies
which can be used at the operational level by cyber security analysts during risk assessment,
mitigation, and control programs. Mirkovic and Reiher (2004) have created a taxonomy of
DDOS attacks for classifying threats and defense related to DDOS. Zhu, Cebula and Young
(2010) have suggested a taxonomy for attacks and vulnerabilities that target SCADA systems.
Khattak, Ramay et al. (2014) have proposed a taxonomy of botnet behavior, detection and
defense to classify the characteristics of the botnet threat. Hoque, Baishya et al. (2014) have
presented a taxonomy of network tools and systems that could be used to conduct cyber attacks.
Loukas, Gan et al. (2013) developed a taxonomy of attack and defense mechanisms that could be
applied to emergency management. All these taxonomy may help the cyber defenders to
understand how cyber intrusion can be triggered.
In contrast, some recent studies have attempted to illustrate a series of cyber activities, events or
incidents that are relatively associated with each other, so the various categories can interact,

link, and collaborate to describe the cyber threat. These studies go beyond the context of
phenomena by looking at the motivation, relationships, interaction and impacts of cyber attacks.
These taxonomies can be counted for strategic taxonomies that can be called in the planning of
cyber strategies (Scott and Angelos, 2013 and Uma and Padmavathi, 2013).

3. Cyber Defense Reference Model:
The U.S Air Force research laboratory has presented a cyber-kinetic reference model that can be
used during cyber attacks (Mudge and Lingley 2008). This study has adopted this reference
model -with slight changes in the order-to demonstrate the cyber defense capabilities (See Figure
1). We perceive that the proposed model can describe the interaction between cyber defense
capabilities and preparation processes that are required to protect the assets. It is closely matched
with research objectives by accommodating previous study shortcomings. First, this model can
mitigate cyber attacks that end in cyber-physical loss. Second, defense capabilities are strategydriven controls that can be called to defend or respond to cyber threats; thus the depicted model
can also be used as a tool during the planning for a cyber defense strategy. Third, cyber security
is achieved by interaction and synergy between capabilities, cyber processes and critical assets,
which is essential to safeguard against a sophisticated blended attack. Moreover, the proposed
model can provide enough insight to illustrate and respond to blended and complex cyber
attacks. Furthermore, it can provide an opportunity for defenders to respond to a physical impact
that is associated with a cyber attack. Figure 1 depicts the proposed cyber-kinetic reference
model.
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Figure 1: Cyber-Kinetic Reference Model

4. Criteria for an Acceptable Taxonomy
The requirement for an acceptable taxonomy has been demonstrated comprehensively in
previous literature. Hansman and Hunt (2004), and Lindquist and Johnson (1997) enumerated
several characteristics for a good taxonomy like, accepted, comprehensible, exhaustive,
repeatable, unambiguous, useful and mutually exclusive.
Pertinent to taxonomy evolution, Igure et al (2008) has conducted a comprehensive survey on
available taxonomies between 1984 and 2005, in contrast with the extant literature they
perceived that taxonomy’s classes do not need to be mutually exclusive for the following
reasons. First, to produce a greater coverage. Second, a vulnerability which cannot be detected
under one category might be discovered under a second category. Moreover, with the advent of
blended attacks which are using multiple attack vectors, classification of a threat or vulnerability
under one category cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the links between
attackers, vectors, targets and the impacts of the attack.

5. Cyber Capability Defense Model and Taxonomy
The primary objective of this study was to provide a taxonomy that could differentiate between
the various types of defensive mechanisms that could be used to mitigate or respond to cyber
attacks.
It also assists the users to link and transit between dimensions and sub-categories to apply
appropriate defense mechanisms in order to cope with the ever-changing nature of cyber attacks.
Applying an appropriate defense strategy requires the identification of all the key actors in the
cyberspace. The actors are an intrinsic part of cyber incidents whether for being accountable as
the attack perpetrator or assisting the attacked parties to repel or respond to cyber attacks.
Therefore, unlike the previous studies, the proposed taxonomy has attempted to identify all
involved players in cyberspace.
Figure 2 provides an overview of proposed taxonomy, which is divided into three distinct
dimensions: asset, capability and preparation processes. Since this taxonomy is designed to be
expandable, the additional dimensions or categories can be added to satisfy the future needs.
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Figure 2: Cyber Capability Defense Model and Taxonomy Overview

5.1 Assets
Asset can be defined as resources valuable to governments, organizations and individuals (ISO
2012) that are related to cyberspace. Assets possess tangible or intangible value that is needed to
be protected against cyber threats.

5.1.1 Hardware
A hardware asset is defined by any technological equipment that facilitates a service or value to
the end users. Hardware are used to transfer, store, process, control or present the information or
services to the users. Computers, network equipment, IT Infrastructure, SCADA systems and
fibre cables are examples of hardware assets.

5.1.2 Software
A software asset refers to IT application, software or database that is widely used by individuals,
organizations or governments.

5.1.3 Information
An information asset refers to information processed, stored and transported by internetworked
information systems (ISACA 2014).

5.1.4 People
People relate to human factors of cyberspace who are often targeted as the principals of cyber
attacks. People are actively interacting with cyberspace through seeking or facilitating particular
services (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).

5.2 Capabilities
Cyber capabilities are defined by the ability of a cyber defender to prepare, prevent, detect and
respond to a cyber attack (Jordan and Hallingstad 2011).The capabilities are very complex,
technical, strategic and operational abilities of a defender to confront a cyber threat. This notion
requires the development of strategic tools for active and passive defense and collaboration with
other key players.

5.2.1 Passive Defense (PD)
PD (See Figure 3) refers to all the measures and controls that could be used passively to protect,
detect, respond and recover to the cyber threat. PD will provide a vehicle to focus on making
cyber assets more resistant or resilient to cyber attacks (Denning 2014).
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Figure 3: Passive Defense Classification
Protect
Protect refers to prepare and implement the proper safeguards to ensure the delivery of service
assets (NIST, 2014). Cyber security protection can be achieved by using whitelisting techniques,
defense-in-depth mechanisms or patching processes. Antivirus software, firewalls, access
controls, penetration testing, audits are examples of system protection.
Detect
Detect refers to developing and implementing processes and activities to discover the occurrence
of cyber events (NIST, 2014).In this stage, it is assumed that an undesirable event has happened
in our systems. Detection can be achieved through monitoring and surveillance mechanisms or
technologies. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), Security Incident Event Management (SIEM),
data and voice surveillance are techniques and technologies that can be applied for this purpose.

Respond
Respond refers to developing and implementing the activities to respond to a detected cyber
event (NIST, 2014).A successful response will contain the effect and impact of cyber attack. For
instance, Network segregation and Internet kill switch are the technical solutions; often by
autocratic governments; to respond or to mitigate the severe impact of cyber threats.
Recover
Recovery refers to developing and implementing activities or processes that restore the
compromised or degraded services to its normal operation (NIST, 2014).Business continuity and
Disaster recovery are the programs that can be used to minimize the disruptive effect of cyber
incidents.

5.2.2 Active Defense (AD)
AD(See Figure 4) refers to a real-time capability to minimize the impact of the cyber attacks
(Rosenweig, 2014). AD may use some types of offensive ability to discover, destruct, disrupt,
degrade or nullify incoming cyber threats. Denning (2014) perceived that all of the safeguards in
AD are analogous to air and missile defense aims to shoot down or deflect the attacker’s missile
or rocket.
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Figure 4: Active Defense Classification

Cyber-Kinetic (Cyber Adjunct to Kinetic) Operation:
The intent of cyber-kinetic is to defend against kinetic effects of cyber attacks through an active
defense operation. Cyber adjunct to kinetic operation can be classified as the following:
 Destruction- Destruction occurs when the IT hardware or equipment is modified from their
original stage; hence the damaged devices are malfunctioned or not function properly. s.
Stuxnet worm, Siberian pipeline sabotage or operation Orchard are examples of destruction
operation by means of cyber kinetic capabilities (Clarke and Knake 2011).
 Disruption- Disruption refers to a kind of denial of service or unauthorised usage of resources
in which the target’s resources are fully exhausted, consumed or unavailable to the legitimate
users.
 Degradation- Degradation of service occurs when the required services are falling outside
predetermined service level, so the legitimate user will experience the lower quality of
service (QOS).




Nullification- Nullification refers to the ability of an entity to nullify a cyber attack by using
electronic or cyber capability (Andress and Winterfeld 2011).
Discovery- Discovery is the ability of an entity to discover valuable information about the
target from various sources. Social engineering and Reconnaissance are the methods that can
control human behaviour to acquire useful information about a prospective target. Phishing,
Vishing, Psychological operation (Psyops) and Open source Intelligence (OSINT)) are the
common types of discovery operation.

5.2.3 Collaborative Defense
Collaborative defense, see Figure 4, is the ability of a defender to rely on the support of
organizations, international bodies or other nations to stop a cyber attack. Collaborative defense
can be achieved by operational cooperation of different actors against a common cyber event.
(Klimburg 2012)
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Figure 5: Collaborative Defense Classification

Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence refers to the collected information that are analysed and contextualized; so it can be
used by policy makers for efficient decision-making on matters of interest. Intelligence sharing
can be an asymmetric operation that one party may share more information than their
counterparts. It also helps involved parties to achieve superiority in cyberspace (Rovner,
Mahoney et al. 2013). Echelon operation, Magic Lantern and Five Eye (FVEY) operations are
sitting in this setting (Andress and Winterfeld 2011, Janczewski 2014).
Infrastructure Sharing
Infrastructure sharing is a strategy that used to share infrastructure to drive innovation, reducing
the cost and increasing the security safeguards (Hathaway 2014).
Knowledge Sharing
Knowledge sharing programs can help cyber allies to achieve higher skills and experiences.
Cyber coalitions can exchange their knowledge and experiences in training and awareness
programs, research and development projects, and cyber exercises. The US Cyber Storm III
exercise and NATO Cyber Sea maneuver are falling into this section (Klimburg 2012).

5.2.3 Actors
Actors are the entities that are interacting and participating in cyber activities (See Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Actor Classification

Organized Actor
Any actors with a basic command structure, resources, funds, vision and objectives are counted
as organized actors (Bruderlein 2000).
 Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) - Many IGOs (see Table 1) are focusing on
international cyber security issues. IGOs vary significantly in size, scope, expertise and
legitimacy (Kahn, McConnell et al. 2011).
IGOs

Liability

Cyber Activity

Members

United Nations (UN)

International treaty
based with legal
authority

International
Telecommunication Union(ITU)

Treaty based
organization

Coordination ,Guidelines,
technical standards and
education

193 countries
and 700
companies

European Union (EU)

Governing body

Legislation, policy maker

28 countries

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)

Treaty based
organization

Guidelines, education,
cyber/military Prevention and
Response cooperation

33 countries

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)

International Forum

Publications and reports

34 countries

International Forum

Publications and reports

21 countries

Regional Security
Organization

Training , workshops and reports

57 countries
11 partners

Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation(APEC)
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Policy maker , Disputes, and
Reports

193 countries

Table 1: IGOs and Related Cyber Activities



International Internet Technical Organization (IITO)-IITO are managing and developing
standards, protocols and technical documents (Kahn, McConnell et al. 2011).
Institution- Institutions is a structure or mechanism with a particular behaviour. In the cyber
domain, institutions are created in response to imminent cyber threats. These institutions are
funded national authority with international scope; however they are not in a form of IGOs
(Choucri et al. 2014).

IITO

Structure

Cyber Activity

Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers(ICANN)

Non-Profit corporation

Manage IP addresses and DNS

Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF)

Non-Profit corporation

Design and develop technology,
protocols and guideline

The World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C)

Committee

Web Standards

Table 2: IITOs and Related Activates

Institutions

Scope

Cyber Activity

Computer Emergency Response
Team Coordination Centre (CERT –
CC)

International

Coordination of global CERT

Asia Pacific( AP)-CERT

Regional -Asia

Asian Regional coordination

TF-CSIRT

Regional -Europe

European regional coordination

Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams(FIRST)

International

Forum and Information sharing

International Multilateral Partnership
Against Cyber Threat(IMPACT)

International

Global threat response centre

Table 3: Institutions and Related Activates




Criminals- Cyber criminals are the enterprises that seek to achieve financial gain through
illegal activities. As cyber criminals become more decentralised, they become more
organized and gain more technical knowledge and resources.
Terrorists and Militia groups – Cyber terrorists can impose a permanent cyber threat to the
government and populace by attacking networks, information systems and infrastructure that
are using internetworked information systems (Kallberg and Thuraisingham 2013).

Non-Organized
Any actors without the basic requirements of organized actors can be defined as non-organized
actors.
 Hackers- Hackers are often individuals who exploit vulnerabilities in a computer or system
networks. Hacker’s motivations are varied broadly from reputation to financial gains.
Hackers’ morals or ethics are the metrics that are classified as Black Hat, White Hat, and
Grey Hat, etc.
 Hacktivists -Hacktivists are often politically motivated individual hackers that attack specific
targets to achieve ideological goals.
 Whistleblowers- Whistleblowers are mainly individuals that are exposing and leaking
misconducts or illegal activities occurring in governments, organizations, etc. The recent
revelation of Snowden is an example of this activity.
 Cyber Warrior-Cyber fighters are nationally motivated citizens that are acting against other
political parties that are opposing them.

5.3 Preparation Process
The Art of War has given us the challenges to not rely on the likelihood of the enemy’s not
coming, instead on our readiness to receive them (Sun-tzu, Sawyer et al. 1994).The preparation
process will help an entity to prepare and develop a cyber response plan prior to a cyber attack.
Providing sufficient preparation will facilitate smooth execution of a cyber capability during a
cyber attack. The image of cyberspace, threat and vulnerability is changing prominently over a
period; hence developing a single defense strategy is not compelling, considering the complex
nature and severe impacts of cyber attacks. While the need for multiple defense strategies is
evident, the preparation phase will also facilitate a smooth transition to various cyber capabilities
during a cyber attack.

5.3.1 Planning
The planning phase require to prepare an approach for a cyber defense plan prior to a cyber
attack. The planning phase require to consider the worst case and best case attack scenarios to
help the defenders to apply the most appropriate defense capabilities.

5.3.2 Communication
Communication Preparation require to establish a comprehensive plan to interact with all the
required stakeholders during and prior to the cyber threat.

5.3.3 Activation
Developing a process to activate a cyber defense capability in a timely manner.

5.3.4 Evaluate
All the preparation procedures need to be continuously tested, evaluated and updated to ensure
that they are enforced during cyber attack incidents. The evaluation can be performed through
audits, maneuvers, exercise and previous experiences.

6. Conclusion and Future Work
The overall objective of development this taxonomy was providing all interested parties researchers, business and government organizations- with a tool for an overall evaluation of their
security status and quick finding of weak points of their cyber defense mechanisms. As we
indicated in the introduction to this paper, our approach to the problem was taken from so-called
McCumber Cube (2004). In this Cube, all security issues are grouped into small spaces and
evaluated separately. We believe that the same approach should be used in researching security
systems. Foundation stone of such method is based on the development of a useful taxonomy of
cyber defenses capabilities. And it was the main objective of this research. The taxonomy has
been introduced through a process of modification of a base cyber defense model, which can be
used as a foundation for national cyber defense development.
We assume that this taxonomy and cyber defense process model will be useful to cyber
defenders to grasp a better understanding of cyber defense capabilities that can be used to
mitigate and respond to the cyber attacks. Governments and organizations can use the different
categories of this taxonomy to build a robust and an effective cyber defense strategy to safeguard
against the cyber threats. The proposed study also provides a valuable insight to cyber security
controls and mechanisms that can be used to mitigate current cyber attacks.

We do not claim that this study has addressed all possible security controls; however, we
perceive that the taxonomy can be used by the cyber security practitioners to facilitate cyber
security implementation.
From the organization perspective, this study has classified various international agencies,
organizations and authorities that can offer technical and logistical support to the nation states
and cyber defenders. The proposed taxonomy is extensible; hence other scholars can add other
dimensions or classifications to the current study. The Attacker’s motivations are not addressed
in this study so future research can focus on the motivational aspect of cyber attacks.
Finally, taxonomies need to get updated with the rapid speed of changes in technology, attack
mechanism, regulation or attacker motivation. We will constantly try to track these changes and
apply them to our taxonomy to make it current.
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